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SUMMARY OF REPLY 
Both Respondents, the Board of Oil# Gas & Mining (the "Board") 
and BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc. ("BHP"), err in their arguments 
by assuming that the terms of the Unit Operating Agreement and Unit 
Agreement address, much less govern, the main question in this 
case—is Petitioner, Sam Oil, Inc. ("Sam Oil") subject to a non-
consent penalty. Sam Oil has appealed the Board's legal conclusion 
that those contracts impose a non-consent penalty on Sam Oil. The 
Board and BHP argue only that sufficient evidence exists to support 
the Board's finding of no exception to the contractual penalty. 
Yet both BHP and the Board fail wholly to point to any language in 
those contracts which would require the penalty in the first place. 
Moreover, both BHP and the Board fail to address the fundamental 
concept that a penalty is justified, and BHP can avoid liability, 
only if notice and an opportunity to participate is given.1 
Moreover, the Board's factual findings are not supported by the 
Record. 
In addition, Petitioner questions the standing of the Board 
to argue affirmance of its own decisions and the propriety of such. 
Finally, no special deference need be given to the Board's findings 
or conclusions as the Board has no special expertise with respect 
xThe Board argues that creation of the Unit in 1950 gave 
notice to Petitioner's predecessors of the drilling of the subject 
well and an opportunity to participate. This conclusion was not 
made by the Board in its Order nor is it supported by any shred of 
evidence in the Record. 
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to contractual interpretation or the law regarding non-consent 
penalties. 
ARGUMENT 
L. THE BOARD LACKS STANDING TO ARGUE IN THIS MATTER AND ITS BRIEF 
SHOULD BE STRICKEN, 
Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that "In each case, the agency shall be named respondent," 
However, that requirement does not necessarily mean that the Board 
has standing to present arguments in this matter to support its own 
ruling. 
As a general rule a court or board exercising judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions, not being a party to its 
proceedings, and not having any legal interest in 
maintaining its determination, is not a party aggrieved 
by a judgment or order reversing its own proceedings, and 
is not entitled to appeal from such judgment or order, 
or to be heard on such appeal, under a statute which in 
general terms authorizes an appeal by any party 
aggrieved. 
4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error §234. 
Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-l, et seq. (1990), does not provide the agency, from which 
the appeal is taken, with standing. Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure requires that the agency be named as a 
respondent, but does not address the agency's standing to appeal. 
Sam Oil can only suggest that the purpose for naming the agency is 
one of notice and simplicity since it should be determined by the 
Court whether an agency has standing. If the agency has no 
standing that matter should be brought to the Court's attention by 
2 
a motion to strike. There are no reported Utah decisions dealing 
with this issue. 
The issue has been addressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court. 
Continental Oil Company v. Oil Conservation Commission, 
373 P.2d 809 (N. Mex. 1962) In that case, the Oil Conservation 
Commission had been denied the right to actively participate in an 
appeal of its gas proration order to the trial court. The New 
Mexico court recognized the distinction between an agency's 
administrative function and its judicial function. With respect 
to the former, the agency acts to represent the public's interests 
and is therefore a proper party to an appeal. In the latter case, 
the agency sits as a court in resolution of private disputes 
between parties. If no public interest is being protected or 
forwarded by the agency, it is not a proper party to an appeal.2 
This matter was brought before the Board by Sam Oil seeking 
an accounting of revenues produced from a well operated by BHP 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-9 (1989). The statute is 
"a unique conservation statute in that it provides a forum for 
Board resolution of production payment and royalty interest 
disputes between private parties." D. Dragoo and R. Storey, Utah's 
2
"Thus, in regard to quasi-judicial agencies with simply the 
functions of finding facts and applying the law to the facts, and 
where no statute provides otherwise, the courts have held that the 
agency is without right to appeal from such decision, the 
administrative agency being in no different position from a court 
or judge which has rendered a decision." 2 Am. Jur. 2d 
Administrative Law S774 (1962). 
3 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1983, 5 JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW & 
POLICY 49, 65. The statute was a re-enactment of a prior similar 
provision that "involved the Board in private contractual disputes 
in which the state had no identifiable interest. That remedy was 
separate and apart from the Board's activities regulating the 
efficient production of the State's oil and gas resources." Id. 
No public interest, other than swift adjudication of private 
rights, is involved here. The question presented to the Board 
concerns only entitlement to money as between two private parties. 
The Board was not asked to apply any statute or rule to this 
controversy until it had first determined that the failure to pay 
Sam Oil was without reasonable justification. Utah Code Ann. 
§40-6-9. The Board considered only the contract between the 
parties and common law principles. Indeed, Sam Oil could have 
brought this matter before a trial court of this state. 
Accordingly, the Board was acting solely in a judicial role and 
should not be allowed to participate in this appeal. By separate 
motion, Sam Oil has respectfully requested that the Board's Brief 
be stricken and not considered by the Court. 
BJL NEITHER THE UNIT AGREEMENT NOR THE UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENT 
PURPORT TO GOVERN THE IMPOSITION OF A NON-CONSENT PENALTY ON 
A PARTY WHO JOINS THE UNIT AFTER A WELL IS COMMENCED, 
Both the Board and BHP premise their entire arguments and 
positions on the premise that either the Unit Agreement or the Unit 
Operating Agreement, as amended, require the imposition of a 
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penalty on Sam Oil. They do not argue that imposition of a penalty 
is based on anything other than those two agreements. However, the 
Board and BHP fail to address the total absence of any provisions 
in the Unit Agreement and Unit Operating Agreement which even 
address this situation, much less justify the imposition of a non-
consent penalty on Petitioner. The only provision in either 
agreement addressing a non-consent penalty is Section 9 of the Unit 
Operating Agreement. (Ex. 16; Add. "D" 27-28)3 That provision 
permits a non-consent penalty only when notice is given containing 
specifics of a proposed action such as drilling a well. The 
penalty is only allowed under those circumstances. It is 
uncontested that no such notice was given to Sam Oil or its lessor. 
Nor does the Unit Agreement govern this dispute. Both BHP and 
the Board refer to Section 27 of the Unit Agreement. (R. 248-9) 
That provision concerns only the process of joinder and does not 
address any penalty or other aspects of the allocation of costs and 
revenues. Indeed, the Bureau of Land Management, the governing 
federal agency, stated before the Board that it has no interest in 
the allocation of the costs and revenues among working interest 
owners. (R. 203-210) 
Contrary to BHP's belief, this case involves much more than 
factual questions. Indeed, it is the Board's error on the 
3Addenda references are to the Addenda to Sam Oil's principal 
brief. 
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application of the agreements that has brought on the misdirected 
discussion regarding an "exception" to the imposition of a penalty 
and the ensuing dispute regarding what Sam Oil knew and when it 
knew it. The Board erred when it decided that as a general rule 
the Unit Agreement and Unit Operating Agreements (both attached as 
addenda to the Board's Brief) required the imposition of a penalty 
on Sam Oil. Those contracts do not address the imposition of a 
penalty on a party in a unit who joins the unit after it is created 
and wells are drilled. Notably, neither BHP nor the Board cite any 
authority supporting the Board's decision. Neither the Board nor 
BHP refute Mr. Lear's expert testimony that (i) subsequent joinder 
was not addressed at all in the Unit Operating Agreement, the sole 
contract which addresses a non-consent penalty (TR1. 121), and that 
(ii) absent notice, no penalty is appropriate unless fairness would 
require a penalty, i.e. some equitable substitute for notice exists 
such as actual knowledge—the "equitable exception" of which Mr. 
Lear spoke and of which the Board and BHP are so utterly confused 
(TR1. 123-4). 
Accordingly, for a penalty to have been properly imposed under 
the agreement, notice and an opportunity to participate are 
required. See, Section 9 of the Unit Operating Agreement and 
Add. "D" 27-29. Not only does the Unit Operating Agreement require 
notice with respect to parties to the Agreement, but the common law 
and notions of due process require the same in the absence of an 
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agreement. Either view of Sam Oil's position requires notice. To 
avoid that result BHP, not Sam Oil, must show equitable 
considerations which would justify a penalty. 
The Board and BHP ignore the express terms of the agreements 
and argue that a penalty is equitable based on a presumption that 
the Unit could not have been created without notice to all parties 
owning land within the geographic area of the Unit, and that Sam 
Oil and its predecessors in interest, therefore, must have received 
notice and refused an opportunity to join the Unit denying the 
thirty years prior to this dispute. This argument fails for a 
number of reasons. 
First, there is no evidence that the regulation cited by the 
Board and BHP (43 C.F.R. §3181.3) was in existence in 1950 when the 
Unit was created. Second, there is no evidence that Sam Oil's 
predecessors were actually given notice and refused to join as is 
required by the regulation cited by the Board and BHP. Third, the 
Unit Operating Agreement requires a specific notice in writing with 
specific information upon which a party can make an intelligent 
decision to participate in the drilling of a well. The "notice" 
argued by the Board does not come close to meeting the specifics 
of the notice required by the Agreement. 
Fourth, the argument lacks contractual logic. On the one 
hand, the Board argues that since Sam Oil was not a party to the 
Unit Operating Agreement prior to commencing the Well, BHP had no 
7 
contractual duty to give Sam Oil or its lessor notice. Yet on the 
other hand, even though Sam Oil was not a party to the Unit 
Operating Agreement, the Board argues that the penalty in the 
Agreement should be imposed. This argument foists the burden of 
the penalty on Sam Oil without the benefit of the contractual 
notice requirement. BHP can not have it both ways. 
Finally, BHP had notice of Sam Oil's request to join the Unit 
and participate in the subject Well. Yet BHP did nothing to advise 
Sam Oil that it would be subject to a penalty or otherwise 
condition Sam Oil's joinder on the imposition of a penalty. 
Accordingly, the presumed "notice" argued by the Board, if there 
ever was any, is not notice sufficient to justify a penalty. BHP 
could have protected itself early on by creatively dealing with an 
unusual situation and allowing Sam Oil's participation and 
accepting its share of the costs up front, contingent on joining 
the Unit. Instead, BHP lamely argues that its was only following 
the rules set by the federal government; which in fact set no such 
rules. 
The Board's lengthy discussion of the differences between 
federal and state unitization or pooling terminology does nothing 
to help solve the questions presented in this case. The Board's 
argument is a distinction without a difference given that the 
federal government is not concerned with the allocation of costs 
and revenues. A more appropriate standard for that resolution are 
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the fundamental principles of fairness and due process which are 
not dependent on any federal/state distinction. The authorities 
and arguments discussed in Sam Oil's Brief, based on those notions, 
are applicable and controlling. 
Sam Oil is not required to show any exception to the contracts 
since those contracts do not deal with the situation. The Board's 
fundamental error is its conclusion that the Unit Operating 
Agreement states a "general rule." Contracts do not state general 
rules; they state specific rules that govern the actions of the 
parties. The contracts in this case contain no specific rules 
governing this situation. Common law states general rules. In 
this case, common law requires that notice and an opportunity to 
participate be given before a penalty is imposed. Sam Oil is not 
asking that it participate for free. It expressed its willingness 
to pay its share of costs at an early stage. It is only asking 
that it not be subject to a penalty when it had no real opportunity 
to avoid it. 
L. SAM OIL HAD NO KNOWLEDGE PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF THE WELL 
WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE EQUITABLY FOR THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY 
THE UNIT OPERATING AGREEMENT OR LAW. 
Most of the dispute with respect to the Board's findings 
concern what Sam Oil knew and when it knew it. The essence of the 
two express findings of the Board (Finding No.'s 3 and 4; R. 448; 
Add. "A" 3) and the implicit finding that Sam Oil purposefully 
delayed ratification ("The ratification was not signed until well 
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after it was received and after the well had been completed.") 
(TR1. 281; Add. "C" 11), are the main focus of Sam Oil's appeal of 
the Board's factual findings. Sam Oil has attacked those express 
and implied findings of fact since it is clear that the Board 
relied on them in dismissing Sam Oil's petition. 
The Board has argued first that those findings are not 
necessary to support the Board's Orders (Board's Brief at 32).4 
Then the Board argues that it made its findings based on its 
conclusion that Sam Oil's principal witness, Steven Malnar, was 
not credible. However, the record lacks any evidence to dispute 
Mr. Malnar's testimony and to support the Board's disputed 
findings. Those findings must be supported by substantial 
evidence, not just a disbelief of testimony in the absence of 
supporting evidence. Moreover, the supposed "egregious samples of 
testimony" (Board's Brief at 32-33) do not evidence any lack of 
credibility.5 
4If that statement is correct, the Court should ignore those 
findings and decide this case assuming that no evidence supports 
these findings. 
5As expressed above, Sam Oil has significant concern with the 
propriety of the quasi-judicial body appealed from, the Board, 
arguing before the appellate court that it considered witnesses to 
not be credible. Mr. Malnar frequently appears before the Board. 
It is impossible for Sam Oil to ascertain whether the Board's 
disbelief of Mr Malnar is based solely on his testimony in this 
matter or may be based on other matters. Accordingly, Sam Oil 
believes it is prejudicial for the Board to take an adversarial 
role in interpreting and arguing the record in this case. In any 
other case, would the appellate court permit a juror or the trial 
judge to argue the credibility of witnesses on appeal? 
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BHP convinced the Board, and would have this Court believe, 
that the evidence shows that Sam Oil intentionally delayed joinder 
or commitment in order to obtain knowledge regarding the subject 
well prior to committing. The evidence does not support that 
conclusion. First, as argued in Sam Oil's Brief and not refuted 
by the Board or BHP, Sam Oil could not have joined the Unit any 
earlier than it did due to delays by the Unit Operator, Rio Bravo 
Oil Company, in forwarding the necessary joinder documents to Sam 
Oil. Indeed, the Well was completed before Sam Oil even received 
those documents. The Well was completed on January 16, 1984 
(Finding No. 9, Add. "A" 4); Sam Oil received the documents on 
January 9, 1984 (R. 395). Second, Sam Oil had no knowledge of the 
success of the well prior to signing the ratification documents and 
joining the Unit. Mr. Malnar had been told that the well was good, 
but that characterization is inconclusive. Indeed, BHP admits that 
it had no idea what Mr. Malnar knew. (TR1. 223-224) 
Likewise, Sam Oil did not know of the unleased Robertson 
acreage in May of 1983 or prior to commencement of the drilling of 
the Well. In May 1983 Mr. Malnar discovered that land in the Unit 
was subject to a Tenneco Oil Company lease. (TR1. 79; R. 396-7) 
It was not until September 1983 that Mr. Malnar discovered the 
unleased acreage of Hazel Robertson and obtained the first lease 
from her on September 29, 1983. (R. 396-7; TR1. 48) Accordingly, 
Mr. Malnar did not even have any rights to assert prior to 
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commencement of the Well on September 11, 1983. If Mr. Malnar knew 
in May 1983 of the unleased Robertson acreage, why would he have 
risked not being able to convince Ms. Robertson to lease if he had 
planned to sit back and wait to see the results of the Well. Why 
would he not have waited until after the Well was completed to seek 
joinder? Why would he have contacted BHP before completion? These 
questions show the weakness in the Board's factual findings. 
No evidence exists to suggest, much less prove, that Mr. 
Malnar had any knowledge of the Well proposal prior to September 
11, 1983, or that production from the proposed Well would possibly 
benefit the Robertson property since it was located quite some 
distance from the Well site in another section of land.6 
This Court must remember that it is undisputed that neither 
Mr. Malnar nor Ms. Robertson were contacted with any proposal to 
drill the Well. Once Mr. Malnar acquired the lease for Sam Oil, 
in October 1983 he diligently contacted all parties who might give 
him information concerning participation in the Unit and any wells 
in the Unit. (Ex.'s 2 and 4) The unavoidably delayed ratification 
6BHP suggests that Mr. Malnar testified that he learned about 
deep wells in the Unit prior to September 11, 1983. (BHP's Brief 
at 11) Even the language quoted by BHP shows Mr. Malnar did not 
know where any well was proposed and that a lot of wells were 
drilling. Moreover, Mr. Malnar testified "I believe Don Johnson 
told me prior to this that there was a possibility of some deep 
wells being drilled in the Roosevelt Unit." (TR1 81, emphasis 
added) The "this" referred to is Mr. Malnar's discussions with Ms. 
Robertson during negotiations of the second lease in November 1983. 
(See Sam Oil's Brief at 28-29) 
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process followed. 
The totality of the facts before the Court do not support the 
Board's findings. It is incredible to believe that Mr. Malnar 
could have masterminded a scheme as elaborate as that attributed 
to him by the Board and BHP. Too many other actors were involved 
(Ms. Robertson, Rio Bravo Oil Company, BHP and Sam Oil's title 
researcher, to name a few) and too much risk existed. Each of the 
supposed samples of incredibility, or support for the Board's 
findings argued by the Board and BHP, has an equal or better 
explanation in light of the whole record. Mr. Malnar simply 
stumbled across a leasing opportunity and acted diligently to 
participate in the Unit. The timing was not of his design or 
doing. He was merely following "the rules." 
While BHP and the Board may attack and twist Mr. Malnar's 
testimony to suit their needs, their arguments are most incredible 
in the face of the total absence of any evidence or testimony in 
the record supporting their arguments. BHP produced only one 
witness, Jerry Bair, who admittedly had no personal knowledge of 
any facts whatsoever. BHP relies solely on its cross-examination 
of Mr. Malnar and its improper conclusions therefrom. If Mr. 
Malnar were not a credible witness, his testimony should not be 
considered. If his testimony is not considered, there is no 
testimony supporting the Board's decision. Sam Oil submits that 
such logic does not produce the "substantial evidence" required to 
13 
support the Board's findings. Accordingly, this Court should 
reverse those findings. 
Us. NO SPECIAL DEFERENCE NEED BE GIVEN TO THE BOARD'S CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW. 
Both the Board and BHP have argued that this Court must defer 
to the Board's legal conclusions due to its expertise. Sam Oil 
submits that the Board has no special expertise in deciding matters 
concerning private contractual disputes. This matter did not 
require the Board to exercise any special expertise regarding oil 
and gas reserves, geographic information or production information. 
The question before the Board was simple, did the contracts between 
the parties require the imposition of a non-consent penalty on Sam 
Oil? By its own admission, the Board did not even reach the 
question of applying the statute (Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9) 
applicable to this matter. (Conclusion No. 5; R. 451) The fact 
that Sam Oil could have properly brought this matter in a trial 
court instead of before the Board evidences that no special 
expertise is needed. 
Moreover, the Board did not exercise an administrative 
function in this case; its role was purely judicial. Granted, some 
understanding of oil and gas law is helpful to the resolution of 
this matter. However, acquiring that understanding is nothing that 
wouldn't be asked of any judicial body. There is nothing special 
about the constitution of the Board that suggests that its members 
have any more expertise in deciding contract disputes than does 
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this Court. For this Court to grant any degree of deference to the 
Board's legal conclusions, this Court must conclude that it is not 
as capable as the Board in interpreting the common law concerning 
contractual disputes in the area of oil and gas law. Sam Oil 
submits that is not the case. 
Finally, BHP's argument that the Board has special expertise 
in this matter is wholly inconsistent with its position taken 
before the Board. Prior to the August 24, 1989, hearing before the 
Board, BHP filed a federal interpleader action and sought an order 
from the Federal District Court staying the Board hearing on 
jurisdictional grounds; that motion for stay was denied. 
(R. 221-317; TR1. 36) BHP argued that this dispute concerns 
contractual issues as to the effect of the non-consent provision 
in the agreements between the parties. (TR1. 13) BHP sought to 
exclude those issues from the Board's consideration. The Board, 
however, ruled that it had discretion to hear contractual disputes 
as an adjunct to its authority under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9. 
(TR1. 40-41). BHP's argument that the Board had some special 
expertise in resolution of these contractual issues is absolutely 
contrary to its prior position. BHP should be estopped from now 
arguing that the Board has some special expertise requiring this 
Court's deference. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental err committed by the Board was its legal 
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conclusion that Sam Oil was subject to a non-consent penalty as a 
"general rule" without any basis existing therefor in the contract 
between the parties. Sam Oil does not need to show any "exception" 
to avoid a non-consent penalty; no penalty was applicable in the 
first case. Sam Oil complied with every request in joining the 
Unit and seeking an opportunity to participate in the Well, only 
to be told it had to pay a 200% bonus to BHP. Sam Oil had no 
knowledge of this penalty going in. BHP could have taken a number 
of steps to protect its interests. It could have objected to Sam 
Oil's joinder, required that Sam Oil's joinder be conditioned on 
acceptance of the penaltyr or accepted Sam Oil's proportionate 
share of the costs of drilling, completing and equipping the Well 
up front, contingent on admission to the Unit. Sam Oil did not 
sleep on its rights; rather, BHP took advantage of a situation to 
reap a windfall from Sam Oil's share of production. 
Fundamental principles of due process and fairness require 
that the Board's Orders be reversed and that the Board be directed 
to enter an Order finding Sam Oil entitled to its share of revenues 
and requiring BHP to justify its withholding of payment of those 
revenues, subject to the remedies and penalties prescribed under 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9. 
DATED January 16, 1991. ANDERSON & WATKINS 
Steven W. Dougheigjfrf fesq. 
Attorneys for Sam Oil, Incl, Petitioner 
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